Introduction -From the Gold Exchange Standard to Bretton Woods
European countries were trading long before the introduction of 19th century monetary standards such as bimetallism, or the Gold Standard. Nevertheless, the adoption of these standards (considered by many to be a form of fixed interest rate), added to the industrial revolution and a period of great technological innovation, resulted in an unprecedented increase in trade and economic transactions between states in the 1800s. The First World War and the ensuing deterioration in the political and economic environment on the European continent during the interwar period -economic stagnation, inefficient allocation of resources which were channelled to the preparation of another conflict, 'beggar-thy-neighbour' policies manifested through currency devaluation and protectionist measures -led to the end of the Gold Standard and to a deterioration in cooperation between countries which persisted until the signature of the Bretton Woods Arrangement in 1944.
From Bretton Woods to the Werner Report
According to Michele Chang, 'the Bretton Woods system was based on the idea that international economic transactions should be promoted via free trade and fixed exchange rates'. The latter were introduced with the dollar exchange standard, under which the dollar was fixed to gold at the price of US$35/ounce and the other currencies were fixed to the dollar. The agreement was signed in 1944, but did not come into operation immediately because, after World War II, many currencies were not convertible and trade was only conducted under non-transferable bilateral credit lines between countries. To supervise the distribution of aid under the Marshall Plan and to resolve this issue, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the European Payments Union were created in 1948 and 1950 respectively.
By the time the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, convertibility was restored and the European Monetary Agreement was established; under this agreement, a European Fund and a Multilateral System of Settlements were created to help members facing balance of payment problems and to facilitate the settlement of transactions between them. In this context, the Treaty did not provide for the monetary organisation of the European Economic Community (EEC). Instead, more importance was given to the establishment of a common market, a customs union and common policies and only limited steps (like the Marjolin Memorandum in 1962, which launched discussion on a common currency and prompted several measures in the field of monetary cooperation 1 ) were taken at European level.
However, tensions began to build as the US experienced balance of payment problems, which led to doubts about the stability of the dollar and in general the stability of the international monetary system as set out at Bretton Woods.
The Werner Report
The situation worsened in 1968-69, when market turbulence forced a revaluation (rise in value) of the German mark and devaluation of the French franc. This endangered the common price system of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and had a negative effect on the intra-Community and international trade of Member States. As a result, the Heads of State or Government requested the Council to draw up a plan for closer monetary integration. The resulting Werner Report, published in 1970, was an ambitious plan, which set out a three-stage 2 process to achieve economic and monetary union within a ten-year period.
The integration strategy outlined in the Werner Report was based on the assumption that exchange rates to the US dollar would remain stable. This proved not to be the case, as in August 1971 the United States decided to temporarily suspend the dollar's convertibility into gold. Even though the plan was never fully implemented, its principles (staged introduction, transfer of decision-making powers on economic policy from the national to the Community level) set the framework for further steps towards monetary integration.
Under the Smithsonian agreement of December 1971, the dollar was devalued by 8.6%, The basic elements of EMS were the definition of the European Currency Unit (ECU) as a basket of national currencies and an Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), which set an exchange rate towards the ECU for each participating currency. On the basis of those 'central' rates, bilateral rates were then established among Member States.
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The system also included a preventive tool 8 to avoid breaking the set exchange rates.
The early years of the EMS saw modest results. According to experts, the turning point came in 1983 when the 'French government decided to follow a franc fort policy, in which monetary policy closely followed that of the German government and became increasingly market oriented.'
Towards an Economic and Monetary Union
During a period of intensifying efforts to create a single market (from the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 to its completion in 1992, the costs created by the existence of several currencies and unstable exchange rates became more evident. Thus, in December 1991, the Heads of State or Government meeting in Maastricht approved the Treaty on European Union, declaring that they were 'resolved to achieve the strengthening and the convergence of their economies and to establish an economic and monetary union including, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, a single and stable currency'. The Treaty provided for the introduction of a monetary policy (Article 3a TEU), implemented by a single and independent central bank (Article 4a TEU), with price stability as a primary objective. It provided legal grounds for the establishment of a single currency, the ECU (Article 3a TEU). Finally, the Treaty set convergence criteria 13 which each Member State had to meet in order to participate in the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
Despite these stabilisation efforts, the destabilising effects of deregulating international financial capital movements under the SEA, and the diverging national monetary and fiscal policies of EMS members (e.g. the UK and reunified Germany) combined with uncertainties related to the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (following its rejection by referendum in Denmark and difficulties in its ratification in France), led to increasing market speculation, culminating in a currency crisis during 1992-93, forcing some Member States (the UK and Italy) to leave the ERM and some others (Spain and Portugal) to devaluate their currency. In an effort to restore stability and discourage speculation, Member States decided in August 1993, to temporarily widen the ERM margins to +/-15%. With the date for the launch of the EMU approaching, public scepticism towards monetary integration grew, especially in Member States with strong currencies, like Germany, which were concerned about maintaining price stability. At the same time, other countries such as France and Spain were more concerned about growth than price stability. This led the European leaders' meeting in Dublin in December 1996 to propose a Stability and Growth Pact, which was a compromise between a German proposal for the creation of a Stability Pact -which would maintain convergence obligations after Member States joined the euro area -and the French, Spanish and Italian concerns that excessive focus on budgetary discipline would be at the expense of growth.
In June 1997, the European Council adopted a Resolution to set up an exchange rate mechanism after the creation of the euro area in 1999. This mechanism, called 'ERM II' because it essentially replaced the ERM mechanism of the EMS, fixed the exchange rate of non-euro area Member States against the euro and allowed it to fluctuate only within set limits, to ensure that exchange rate fluctuations between them would not impact on the economic stability of the single market. Meanwhile, the Member States considerably increased their efforts towards convergence: whereas in 1997 only Finland, Luxembourg and Portugal had achieved all the convergence criteria, 15 by May 1998, the Council decided that 11 Member States 16 satisfied the necessary conditions. 17 Finally, in July 2000, the Council agreed that Greece also fulfilled the convergence criteria -although it needed to continue the intensive structural reforms undertakenand could therefore adopt the single currency. There are currently nine EU Member States whose currency is not the euro. 18 Of those nine Member States, Denmark and the United Kingdom have a special status (based on 'opt-out clauses'), whereas the other seven are prospective candidates for adoption of the euro (i.e. 'Member States with a derogation') and have committed to joining the euro area as soon as they fulfil the entry conditions. Today, the euro area covers a population of 335.4 million (as opposed to 316.5 million in the US), its share of world GDP is 12.1% (16.5% for the US) and its GDP per capita is equal to €28 600 (versus €41 200 for the US).
The euro area before the crisis
The years between the introduction of the euro and the global financial crisis are generally considered as a positive period for euro-area economies. According to Mongelli and Wyplosz, the value of imports and exports of goods within the euro area increased from 26% of GDP in 1998, to 33% of GDP in 2007. In the same period, intraeuro area services trade also went up, from 5% to 7% of GDP. Baldwin, Skudelny and Taglioni found that the EMU had a significant impact on trade flows with non-EMU countries: third countries traded up to 27% more with EMU countries since the creation of EMU. Inflation rates dropped and converged among euro-area countries. 19 Mongelli and Wyplosz observed that this price stability benefited consumers and companies. Moreover, low interest rates have lowered the cost of servicing high public debts. 20 Philip Lane notes that EMU has been associated with 'a substantial increase in cross-EPRS A history of European monetary integration border financial integration across the euro area' which in turn, 'has stimulated financial development (...), through the lowering of transactions costs and the expansion in the volumes of financial assets'. Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, et al. observe that transaction costs in equity and corporate bond markets have fallen considerably, whereas spreads in government-bond markets have narrowed and tended to move together. While retail banking activities remained fragmented, interbank markets have shown considerable integration.
Some researchers however, debate whether the intensified trade and financial integration has increased the general welfare 21 of European citizens: Francesco Caselli, for example, compares EMU countries to the rest of the OECD countries 22 and has found that, in fact, GDP per capita increased at a slower pace in EMU countries in the period up to the crisis.
The crisis -causes and responses
Although the definitive causes and mechanism of the crisis are still debated, many economists tend to agree on the following causes:
 under-pricing of risk by credit rating agencies and the financial markets, which allowed prices of government bonds in the euro area to converge;
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 non-enforcement of the fiscal coordination framework in place (the Stability and Growth Pact), which encouraged some Member States to adopt irresponsible fiscal policies, instead of focusing on the necessary reforms to remain competitive; 24  growing government spending in several Member States, concealed for many years by 'artificial' tax revenues coming from a booming construction sector reliant on property 'bubbles';  the complacent attitude of many euro area banks, leading them to acquire large portions 25 of sovereign debt of the countries of the 'periphery', contributing to 'powerful negative feedback loops' 26 between banks and sovereigns, and excessive exposure to risks in the periphery by banks in the core.
Euro area Member States and institutions are fighting the crisis on different fronts: economic governance was strengthened through a number of initiatives; 27 at the same time, facilities and mechanisms were created to provide assistance and support to Member States in financial difficulties 28 and a Banking Union was founded, to restore financial stability in the euro area, through a safer financial sector and a betterintegrated banking system; finally, non-standard monetary policy measures were introduced, 29 to maintain price stability, stabilise the financial situation and limit financial contagion to the real economy. Thus, financial system collapse was avoided, while foundations were laid for the sector's long-term stability.
Conclusion
European monetary integration refers to a 30-year long process that began at the end of the 1960s as a form of monetary cooperation intended to reduce the excessive influence of the US dollar on domestic exchange rates, and led, through various attempts, to the creation of a Monetary Union and a common currency. This Union brings many benefits to Member States. However, over the past decade, the build-up of macroeconomic imbalances, and the imprudent fiscal policies of some Member States, resulted in the continuing double crisis (banking and sovereign). As a result of this crisis, many individual Member States face difficult re-adjustment processes, and Member
States collectively must reappraise the governance architecture of Monetary Union and adopt new mechanisms to detect, prevent, and correct problematic economic trends. Whatever one's opinion on the process and the outcome of European monetary integration, it is still remarkable that so much progress has been achieved. It should also be kept in mind that 1999 was not the end of the process of monetary integration, as the adjustments during the first decade and during the financial and sovereign debt crises have shown. It is rather a 'work in progress' and its ultimate success or failure will depend on many factors: not only economic, but also political. 4 The Japanese yen appreciated 17%, the German mark 13.5%, the British pound 9%, and the French franc 9%. 5 Italy withdrew from the 'Snake' in February 1973, while France withdrew in January 1974, re-entered in July 1975 and definitively abandoned the mechanism in March 1976. Denmark and the UK joined in May 1972 only to withdraw in June. 6 Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 7 The fluctuation margins around those bilateral rates were fixed at +/-2.25% for all currencies, except the Italian lira, for which it was set at 6% 8 Once the exchange rate of a currency reached 75% of the maximum authorised fluctuation margin, the respective country had to act through interest rate and fiscal policy adjustments. If those adjustments had no effect and the maximum fluctuation margin was reached, then and only then had central banks to intervene by buying or selling the currency. 9 See also R. Solomon 'The Birth of the Euro and Its Effects'. 10 See Dumas memorandum and Italian memorandum, in M. Chang, p. 34. 11 Complete liberalisation of capital movements, full integration of financial markets, irreversible convertibility of currencies, irrevocable fixing of exchange rates, and the possible replacement of national currencies by a single currency. 12 In the first stage, from 1990 until 1994 the internal market would be completed and restrictions on further financial integration would be removed. In the second stage, from 1994 to 1999, the European Monetary Institute would be established to strengthen central bank co-operation and prepare for the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), the transition to the euro would be planned, the future governance of the euro area would be defined and economic convergence between Member States would be achieved. Finally, in the third stage, from
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